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The Eskom Transmission Network experiences an exceptionally high number of line
faults, the cause of which, may not be correctly identified. This thesis analyses a number
of all the possible factors responsible for causing these faults. The objective is to assign
probable causes of these faults and that the correct preventative or corrective measures
may be planned.
The percentage of unexplained line faults is estimated to be 35 % of the total system
faults. It is important for the Transmission Group of Eskom to minimise the number of
faults. Major efforts to minimise identified faults such as bird streamers, veld fires, sugar
cane fIfes, lightning and a hypothesised light pollution, light wetting mechanism has
been undertaken by the transmission grid authority.
This thesis presents an analysis of the statistical data of the unknown faults (unknown
faults is defined as lines that trip due to a reason which could not be identified) that has
been undertaken. This analysis takes into account a number of categories of causes of
line faults. The period, for which the performance of the lines was analysed for was the
years inclusive of 1993 to 1997.
The investigation has focused on the identification of the under-performing lines of the
main Transmission Network. The identified poorly performing lines have been
compared with each other from the perspective of the following variables:
• Region
• Voltage (System Voltage)
• Climatic Data
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• Line faults - Time ofDay analysis
• Line Faults - Time of Year analysis.
The analysis indicates that the majority of unexplained flashovers occur between 22 :00
and 07:00 the following morning (Britten et al, 1999). Almost all of the under
performing lines in South Africa fall in the sub-tropical/humid climatic area. All the
lines studied are insulated with standard glass disc insulators.
The analysis indicated that most of the unexplained line faults occur during the months
when the seasons change, e.g. from autumn to winter. The analysis further indicates that
most unexplained line faults occurred during the months of April to May and August to
September.
Of note is that during the period of this investigation bird guarding was performed on
some lines. Installing bird guards may reduce those line faults that are caused by bird
streamers. However, the bird pollution (deposited on glass disc insulators) that is not
washed off at the same time as the bird guard installation may cause the line to trip due
to the combination of the pollution and wetting resulting in a pollution type flashover.
This is a possible cause of some unexplained line faults that occur from April to May.
Bird streamers are also identified as the most probable cause of the unexplained faults
which occur during the late evening periods (22:00 - 00:00). Pollution (with wetting)
during the early morning periods may result in faults for the period 00:00 to 02:00. Line
faults in the early morning periods (04:00 - 7:00) could be due to bird streamers or
pollution and wetting, depending on the time of year in which the faults occurs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Description of the Eskom Transmission 220 kV, 275 kV, 400 kV & 765 kV
Network
The Eskom Transmission Network consists of a well-integrated system. Thermal
generation plants are mostly situated in the North Eastern part of South Africa
(see Figure1). There are also two pumped storage schemes, two hydroelectric
schemes, two gas turbine stations and one nuclear power station. Due to the long
distances between the generating plants and the large industrial and metropolitan
supply points, Eskom has built very long overhead Transmission lines (e.g. 1500
km long).
Unfortunately the transmission networks in South Africa run across regions of
greatly varying climatic zones. This is suspected as one of the major reasons why
some of the lines perform exceptionally well and other lines do not. The lines are
,""
adequately designed for certain regions and fault mechanisms but under designed
for other regions where different fault mechanisms may occur. Figure 1 shows a
map of the Eskom Transmission Network. Seventy five per cent of the generating
plants are situated in the North Eastern part of the country (Region A) which
forced Eskom to build very long lines (+/- 1500 km) from this area to the Cape
Province (Region B), situated in the South Western part of the country. Largf
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industrial and metropolitan installations along the Kwa-Zulu Natal coast (Region
C) require large amounts of power (3 GW) for these respective activities, and
Eskom Transmission had to expand (and strengthen) the Network in this area due
to an historically slack system.
Overhead transmission line faults affect the quality of supply to customers very
negatively. It is important that Eskom Transmission limits the number of line
faults and especially reduces the occurrence of unexplained faults on the network
in order to improve the Quality of Supply indices.
1.1.1 Geographical extent of the Eskom Transmission 220 kV, 275 kV and 400 kV
lines
The weather patterns and environmental factors that may affect the performance
of a transmission system includes pollution, rainfall patterns, lightning
occurrences and crop and other burning. A brief analysis of each of these factors








Figure 1. Map of the Eskom Transmission Network
The Eskom Transmission Network is spread across South Africa and the regions
are very different in terms of biomes. The concept biome is the description of the
types of vegetation present in an area such as grasslands and forests. The
different biomes regions of South Africa are shown in Figure 2. The biomes may
affect the performance of a constructed and operating transmission line in several
ways. One of the more serious effects is the high number of line faults due to
veld fires through the burning of savannah type grass.
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Figure 2. Biomes Map of South Africa
Of note is the fact that lines running from Region A (Generation Plant) to Region
B are approximately 1500 km long and pass through widely varying regions of
vegetation types (biomes) including grasslands, desserts, semi-desert and areas
covered in species of plant unique to the Cape, i.e. fynbos. Region D also
indicates an area with metropolitan and industrial loads but due to the vast
distances between these loads (Region D) and the generation plant (Region A),
long lines also run between these regions.
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From the analysis it became evident that a high number of unexplained line faults
normally occurred in the Savanna (grassland) areas.
1.1.2 Description of Rainfall Pattern
Figure 3 contains a map that shows the rainfall patterns over the whole country.
The Western Cape area experiences a high winter rainfall pattern whereas the
Northern and Eastern regions experience a summer rainfall pattern. The higher
rainfall areas tend to have higher bird related activities, which may then
influence the performance of the Transmission Overhead Lines. Depending on
the cycles involved, it may be expected that the line faults caused by bird
streamer or bird pollution follows the trend ofwet and dry years.
Region B
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Figure 3. Rainfall Map of South Africa
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1.1.3 Description of dew formation over South Africa
Parts of South Africa may be described as a desert environment as these areas are
mostly dry areas with sand. As indicated by Rizk (Rizk et aI, 1970), desert
climates are characterised by hot days and cool nights. Dew formation on
insulators due to the rapid and large temperature variations that result in the
cooling down of the insulator surface during the night may lead to flashovers.
Figure 4 below indicates that most of the regions have medium to high numbers of
frost days. This will be shown later to be a possible cause of the high number of






Figure 4. Frost Days Map of South Africa
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1.1.4 Lightning map of South Africa
The coastal regions of South Mrica do not experience high lightning activities
compared to the Central and Northern area. Most of the identified problematic
lines fall within the high lightning incidence areas. The Eskom Transmission
Network is negatively affected by this high lightning activity.






























Figure 5. Lightning Map of South Africa
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1.2 Line Construction Factors
The voltage levels, phase to phase and phase to earth clearances, tower types
insulator and bundle types may all be reasonably expected to play a role in any
flashover mechanism occurring on the system. A brief description of the Eskom
network and its construction is therefore included below.
The Eskom Transmission network covers a large area of South Africa. To deliver
the power to the Eskom Customers at the agreed quality, the network needs to be
well integrated. The table below gives an indication of the total length of in-
service lines per voltage category.
Voltage Length
765kV 870 km
533 kV (DC Monopolar) 1035 km




Table 1. Eskom Transmission Line lengths per Voltage
Table 1 indicates that the longest lines are the 400 kV system followed by the
275 kV system. Relatively short length of lines at other voltages do occur but are
not particularly problematic. The study therefore focuses on the 275 kV and
400 kV networks.
For each system voltage the types of towers most generally used are discussed
below.
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1.2.1. Tower Types in use
The four basic types of towers used by Eskom Transmission are: Guyed V, Self
Support or stand alone, Compact Cross Rope or Cross Rope and Delta structures.
The most commonly used structure is the Self Supporting tower. Figures 6,7,8 and
9 give examples of each major transmission tower type.
Figure 9. Guyed V Tower
(765 kV)
Figure 6. Compact Cross Rope
Tower (400 kV)
Figure 8. Self Support Suspension
Tower (275 kV & 400 kV)
Figure 7. Delta Tower
(275 kV)
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The compact or standard cross rope tower is the only tower that does not allow
birds to roost on the tower. Roosting birds may use all the other types of
towers.
1.2.2 Types of glass insulators used
The most common type of insulators used on the transmission system in South
Africa is glass discs insulator. The type of glass insulators used is the standard
glass cap and pin. The standardised creepage length for the 275kV lines is 18
mm/kV whilst for the 400 kV lines it is 23 mm/kV. Anti-fog insulators are
installed in limited areas.
In areas where pollution is present, such as industrial or marine pollution, it has
become practice to install composite insulators. The pollution performance of
these insulators (due to the hydrophobic surface properties) is much better than
the normal glass insulators (which have hydrophilic surface properties).
From the early 1980's a large number of non-ceramic insulators have been
installed on the Eskom system. At transmission level, these have all been silicone
rubber based composite insulators. Failures of these insulators are rare but have
occurred. As the performance of the non-ceramic insulators is not seen as
problematic, this study focuses on lines insulated with glass disc insulators.
Table 2 includes an estimate of the number of glass disc insulators installed on the
transmission network as a percentage of the total number of insulators installed.
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Voltage Number % of Total Insulator Strings
765kV 0 100%
533 kVDC 600 95.27%
(Monopolar):
400kV: 27764 84.77%
275 kV: 22956 74.18%
220 kV: 3568 76%
Total: 53288 82.81%
Table 2. Table of the estimated number of Glass Disc Insulators
installed on the Eskom Transmission Network
This table indicates that approximately 75 % of the 275 kV network and
approximately 85 % of the 400 kV network are still insulated with glass disc
insulators.
1.2.3. Conductor bundles
Eskom Transmission uses different conductor bundles. The majority of these
bundles are twin conductor bundles. On the 400 kV system quad types are also
used. Other bundle types used are hexagonal (765 kV lines) and triple.
Figure 10. Twin Conductor Bundle
Bundle
Figure 11. Hexagonal Conductor
Bundle
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It is not expected that the conductor bundle will be a factor in explaining unknown
causes of flashovers.
1.3 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a description of the Eskom Transmission network. This
description has identified those parameters that would most reasonably be
expected to impact negatively on the overall system performance. These
parameters include identification of biomes (considerations of crop and grass
burning), rainfall patterns, dew and frost formations, lightning incidences and
various construction factors including voltage levels used and the types of
insulators used.




2.1 Review of flashovers
Transmission line design has focussed on fault mechanisms related to
overvoltages generated by lightning and switching surges as well as pollution
flashovers across glass disc insulators. However the performance of a complete
network may be adversely affected by other factors such as vegetation growth,
fires and birds. Each of these mechanisms is reviewed below. A review of basic
mechanisms of AC corona, streamer and leader breakdown is included although in
general the review and later analysis focuses on long air gap breakdowns.
All of the unexplained line faults could be due to one of the above flashover
mechanisms.
2.2 AC corona mechanisms and streamers
Corona is a phenomenon caused by the partial electrical breakdown or ionisation
of the air surrounding a conductor fitting energised at a high voltage. It occurs
when the electric field potential gradient on the surface of the conductor or fitting
exceeds a critical value, usually given by _peek's law (peak) under standard
atmospheric conditions (as given in Kuffel and Zaengl).
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Corona manifests itself as a visible discharge, radio interference, audible noise
and corona losses.
Townsend [Kuffel et aI, 1984] investigated the growth of current as a function of
the applied voltage across an air gap. Townsend proposed that for uniform fields
the growth of charge carriers in the air gap be summarised as follows:
where
atn = no
n is the number of charge carriers
a is Townsend's first ionisation coefficient
x is the distance travelled by discharge
Equation 1
The above equation quantifies the growth of ions in an electrically stressed air
gap, either by electron collisions or by photoionization, as an exponential
function. The phenomenon is termed an electron avalanche. The equation was
later modified to include the effect of electron attachment on the process of charge
carrier multiplication. This relationship is summarised as follows:
Equation 2
where 11 is the attachment coefficient and (a - 11) is know as the effective
ionisation coefficient (a).
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Raether [Kuffel et aI, 1984] observed that when the number of charge carriers was
greater than 106 but smaller than 108 the growth of the electron avalanche was
weakened. When the number of charge carriers exceeded 10
8
the growth of the
charge carriers was exponential and breakdown followed. At this point the electric
field in the air gap was ~31 kV/cm. In a uniform field the start of the electron
avalanche ensures that the entire air gap will break down as a> 1] everywhere.
Raether attributed the observed weakening of the avalanche growth to the space
charge effect of the ion concentrations on the head of the electron avalanche. In
uniform fields, the space charge effects on the growth of the electron avalanche
are negligible. However, in non-uniform fields the space charge effects play an
important role in the mechanism of corona discharge and subsequent air gap
breakdown. Townsend's electron avalanche model hypothesised that the
breakdown time for the air gap should be at least the time taken for an electron to
cross the air gap. Experimental evidence proved that the time to spark was
quicker than this. This observation led to the establishment of the streamer
breakdown model.
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2.3 Long gap Breakdown and leader mechanism
Fundamental information on switching impulse leader characteristics was
provided mainly through the work of Les Renardieres Group, 1972 and EPRI.
Some of the aspects, which are important, are:
Leader propagation IS associated with charge injection at a rate
ql = 40 - 50 JlC/m of axial leader length for rod-plane gaps. The linear
charge density is somewhat higher for spherical electrodes and somewhat
lower for cylindrical conductors.
Under critical conditions, the instantaneous applied impulse voltage
increases so as to maintain a sensibly constant leader tip potential as the
leader continues to penetrate the gap.
The axial leader velocity is normally in the range 1-2 cmlJlS with a frequency
quoted value of 1.5 cmlJls.
With the exception of probable lack of local thermodynamic equilibrium, the
leader bears some resemblance to an electric arc, with a voltage gradient that
depends on the life time, and which varies from an initial Value Ei of
approximately 400 kV/m for a newly created leader segment to an ultimate
value HJC of approximately 50 kV/m. An estimate of the time constant
involved is 50 JlS
From the work of Rizk (Rizk et aI, 1989), it is suggested that, as the leader
propagates into the gap, streamer discharges ahead of the leader (leader corona)
will in general develop under the influence of the leader space charge that is
continually injected into the gap at a rate of ql C/m, the geometric field and
streamers own space charge. As the leader approaches the final jump, the field
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component due to leader space charge becomes most prominent and plays a
decisive role in determining the height of the fmal jump.
Hutzler (Hutzler et aI, 1978) suggested that the breakdown of a large air gap
submitted to a positive switching surge is not an instantaneous phenomenon. The
first corona is the fIrst ionization phenomenon, which may be detected in the gap.
Satisfactory explanations have been given and it has been shown by Carrara
(Carrara et aI, 1976) that its influence on the following aspects of the discharge is
practically zero when the curvature radius of the anode is smaller than a critical
value.
Under certain conditions, the fIfSt corona is followed by one or more dark periods,
but the most important is that breakdown of gaps of several meters in length only
occurs after the start of the leader propagation.
The last phase of the leader propagation is known as the fInal jump. It is only the
conclusion of a process, which has already started and has no effect on the
probability ofbreakdown as long as the voltage impulses applied to the gap do not
decrease too rapidly as in the case of lightning surges.
The Corona Cloud Model
The corona cloud model described by Kline (Kline et aI, 1977) is now discussed:
The following assumptions regarding corona cloud growth are made:
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1. The corona cloud grows from the positive, high voltage electrode, along the
shortest path to the grounded or negative electrode.
2. The corona cloud is a conductor.
The assumed corona cloud shape is based on the shape of the corona luminosity,
which is experimentally observed in rod-plane gaps in the work of Stekolnikov
(Stekolnikov et aI, 1964) and Hutzler (Hutzler et al, 1975). The total corona cloud
length is equal to I + s where I is the leader length and s is the streamer length.
The assumption of a conducting corona cloud simplifies the calculations and
results in a spatial distribution of charge which is qualitatively similar to the
corona cloud charge distribution which were experimentally observed during long
gap breakdown by the work of the Les Renardieres Group, (1974) and Waters
(Waters et aI, 1970).





where Eav = Vld is the average field in the gap of the length d with applied
voltage V and E is the electric field at the tip of the corona cloud. The gap factor
for any electrode geometry can be predicted with the corona cloud model by
making the following additional assumptions:
3. Breakdown occurs at the crest of the critical switching surge.
Equation 4
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4. The corona cloud length at breakdown is equal to (l +s) critical, the corona
cloud length corresponding to Eu,min, the minimum value of En.
5. The actual corona cloud tip field at breakdown is the same for every electrode
geometry.
These three assumptions imply that the gap factor, k, for any geometry is given
by:
k = ~,ns = (En.rrrin)rp
~,rp (En,rrrin )ns
In the above equation rp denotes rod-plane geometry and ns any other geometry.
The corona cloud model as described by assumptions 1 to 5 is independent of gap
length. The magnitude of the actual critical flashover voltage for any electrode
geometry can be calculated from:
~ = k(500do.6 ), d < 5rn




The increase in corona loss as well as the increase of radio interference levels
attributed to atmospheric conditions has been investigated by Boulet (Boulet at aI,
1996). Negative corona modes are suppressed under normal condition during
alternating current operations. Trinth (Trinth et aI, 1968) studied the modes from
corona inception until the onset ofbreakdown streamers.
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Rizk (Rizk et aI, 1997) determined that there is no significant difference between
the sparkover voltages in the presence of fog and dry air for air gaps less that 1
meter.
The flashover voltage of air gaps and insulators depends on the moisture content
of the air. The breakdown voltage dependence on humidity of air gaps may be




where V0 is the breakdown voltage at standard conditions and H is the humidity
correction factor that depends on gap geometry.
With each half cycle of an AC voltage the role that ions play is reversed according
to investigations done by Goldman (Goldman et aI, 1978). The electric field
distribution along the x-axis of the air gap can be determined by the following
expressIOn:
Ex= 2V
(r +2x)ln[(r + 2d)/ r] Equation 8
Where r is the point radius, V is applied voltage, d is air gap length and E is the
electric field in the air gap axis x.
2.4 Lightning flashover mechanism
The Lightning Ground-Flash Density Map indicates that the annual incidence of
lightning in South Africa varies considerably, from less than flash/km2/yr to more
than 12 flasheslkm2/yr in the Drakensberg area~
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A streamer starts from the cloud, becomes a leader and the current in the leader is
in the order of 100 A. This is known as the pilot leader. Once the streamer has
made contact with ground it is believed that a power stroke moves at a very high
speed up towards the cloud along the already ionised path. It is here where the
negative charge of the cloud is neutralised by the positive charge of the ground.
This is clearly visible. There may be another cell of charge in the cloud near the
neutralised charged cell. This cell will try to neutralise through the ionised path.
This streamer is known as a dart leader.
The effect of the dart leader is much more severe than that of the return stroke. It
is found that each thundercloud may obtain as much as 40 charged cells.
When a lightning strike hits an earthwire or tower it raises the voltage potential of
the tower or adjacent towers of a span. The energy needs to be drained down to
earth through the tower earth strap. In a case where the tower earth strap is broken
or the resistivity of the ground is very high the voltage potential of the tower rises
considerably and as a result it may cause back flash over to the live conductor
causing the line to arc.
Lightning trips normally occur in the afternoons and with the Lightning
Positioning And Tracking System (LPATS) it can easily be verified that it was
indeed a line fault caused by lightning. In most of the lightning caused line faults
it is suspected that the strikes do not hit the main live conductor directly as the
earth wire normally shields the main conductor from such a strike. As such most




The back-flashover caused by lightning occurs when a lightning strike hit a tower
or the earth wire of an overhead line. When a lightning strike hits a tower the
stroke current flows through the tower and due to the high resistance of the tower
earth a voltage is produced.
The voltage of the tower rises higher that the earth potential due to the high
resistance of the tower earthing. The potential of the phase conductors does not
change as a result of the lightning strike on the tower. The current of the lightning
strike running through the tower produces a magnetic field in the region of the
tower window between the tower and the phase conductor. As a result a voltage is
produced between the phase conductor and the tower. The voltage also changes
according to the rate of change of the lightning current. A very basic expression
for the voltage developed across the insulator string is;
Vet) = (1- K)[I'R + LdI'/dt] + Vo Equation 9
Where R is the tower footing resistance, L is the geometrical factor relating flux to
current, K is the coefficient of coupling between the shield and phase conductors,
and Vo is the phase to ground system voltage at the time the stroke occurs. The
current I' is less than the stroke current because some of the stroke current flows
away from the tower in the earth wire to the adjacent towers.
2.6 Standard Pollution Flashover Theory
The results presented by Schneider et aI, (1978) indicated that the contaminated
flashover voltage is a non-linear function of string length. This non-linear effect
becomes pronounced for long columns of very large diameter.
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A report compiled by Engelbrecht (Engelbrecht,1996) as well as work done by
Rizk et al (Rizk, 1970) indicated that the driving force behind the pollution
flashover process is the applied voltage. Classically dry band arcing is described
in electrical terms as and arc in series with a resistance representing the
conductive surface layer. It was concluded that the surface layer resistance is the
underlying factor determining whether an insulator will flash over or not. In turn
the surface layer resistance is determined by the conductivity of the layer and the
profile/diameter of the insulator. The worst case conditions in terms of flashover
are thus conditions ofhighest surface layer conductivity.
The following conclusions were made as a result of the work of Schneider
(Schneider et aI, 1978):
Tests on long vertical strings of standard and anti-fog insulators in a fog
chamber have shown that the contamination flashover voltage is a nonlinear
function of string length.
A substantial reduction in flashover voltage was obtained for uniformly
contaminated posts of large diameter compared with smaller posts.
Cold switch on performance of conventional and semi-conducting glaze
Insulators for UHV string lengths is about the same.
For ease of understanding the pollution flashover mechanism it may be divided
into the various phases given below:
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1. Pollution is deposited on the insulator surface. Studies have shown that the
most important mechanism of pollution deposit is through the movement of
air (wind). Most common types of pollution are bird pollution, marine
pollution (salt), agricultural pollution and industrial pollution. The solid
layer deposit generally consists of a soluble component and non-soluble
component.
2. Dry pollution normally has a very high resistance but with the addition of
water the soluble pollution is allowed to dissolve and forms an electrolyte
which will have a conductivity dependant on the type of soluble deposit and
its concentration (usually expressed as mass per surface area i.e. mg/cm2)
3. Once the insulator is covered with an electrolyte layer, current will start to
flow across the insulator surface. Due to the corresponding Joule heating
losses in the electrolyte layer the water will evaporate in some area creating
dry bands. Under these conditions the electric field distribution of the
insulator is higWy disturbed (most of the voltage appearing across the dry
bands) and normally the dry bands will spark over.
4. If the conductivity of the wet surface layer is high enough the dry Bands
arcs may develop into a flashover of the insulator.
The whole process may be summarised as an interaction between the insulator and
pollutants, wetting conditions and applied voltage. The degree to which dry bands
form initially and the rate at which they reabsorb moisture depends on the relative
humidity of the air surrounding the insulator string because the closer the air is to
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saturation, the more the evaporation process IS hindered and the more re-
absorption is enhanced.
In a situation of light rain, the wetting action is also a function of the amount of
rain actually striking the insulator surface. As a result, dry band formation may
not be possible until after the rain ceases. Heavy rain washes the pollutants off the
insulators.
2.7 Bird Streamers
Bird excreta are known to pollute insulator assemblies. When this deposit
become wet, it forms an electrolyte and dry band arcing may result. This
mechanism poses a quality of supply problem, which is prevented by re-insulation
(silicone composite insulators) or spray washing. These faults occur frequently.
This was fIrst postulated as a problem in 1920 in California. Since then
Bonneville Power Administration and Florida Power and Light have referred to it
(Burnham, 1995). In a recent survey of IEEE members, at least 75% of the
respondents indicated line faults attributable to bird streamers. Faults caused by
bird streamers occur when a continuous (or partial) stream of bird excrement,
resulting in a line fault bridges the air gap. The solution offered is to move the
streamer away from the live hardware by means of bird guards. Taylor et aI,
(1999) has investigated these mechanisms in South Africa. These faults pose a
quality of supply problem. Successful reductions in the number of faults were
achieved through the fitting ofbird guards on the 275 kV and 400 kV networks.
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Large birds can cause a flashover by releasing a long continuous emission of
conductive fluid, which shorts out the air gap between the structure and the
conductor. Birds capable of producing these streamers are large raptorial birds
without webbed feet (West et aI, 1971). However, in South Africa this category
could also including perching ducks such as Egyptian and Spruwing geese (Van
Rooyen, personal communication).
The ability of the bird excrement to cause a flashover has been demonstrated in
laboratories on two occasions. West et al. simulated a flashover at 320kV ac and
400 kV dc in 1971 using a mixture, with viscosity and resistivity emulating that of
the streamer. Burger et aI, (1995), did a similar experiment in 1995 at 275 kV dc.
In both cases strong evidence was provided that bird streamers could be a
plausible factor responsible for line faults.
The quantity of excrement of large birds is estimated at 60 cm3 (West et aI, 1971)
and is confrrmed by local ornithologists who put the figure at 50cm3 (Verdoom,
personal communication). The urinary and faeces tracts of a bird join and the
excrement is made through a single orifice called the cloaca. The size of streamer
is highly dependent on the diet and quantity to be eliminated.
A streamer produced by a vulture, estimated at 2,89 m (Van Rooyen et aI, 1999)
was observed on the Edwardsdam-Mareetsane 88 kV line.
A worker of Florida Power and Light recorded another streamer. "An eagle
released a stream of excrement which extended from the crossarm above the
insulator point to a point close to the conductor" (Burnham, 1995).
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Streamers of similar length were produced in laboratory tests, using 50 cm3 to 60
cm3 of excrement substitute. These were capable of bridging both 320 kV and
400 kV dc line-to-ground air gaps (West, 1971). The excrement consists of a
mixture of urine and faeces in the cloaca and the droppings can be grouped in
three patterns: rod shaped, snail shaped and fluid droppings. Carnivorous birds
which consume large amounts of tissue protein produce large volumes of liquid
urates (Burnham, 1995). The consistency and volume of bird dropping caries
greatly according to factors such as diet, quality of food, time of day and species
(Burnham, 1995)(van Rooyen, personal communication). It is clear that
predictions on the behavior ofbirds must be made with extreme caution.
The Bonneville Power Administration experiments, done with excrement·
substitute, indicated that samples of real excrement were alkaline with a resistivity
between 30 ohm-cm and 120 ohm-cm (West et aI, 1971). To simulate the
viscosity, raw scrambled eggs were used. A small amount of salt was added to
lower the resistivity from 130 ohm-cm to 120 ohm-cm (West et aI, 1971).
2.8 Fire Caused Flashovers
Fire has been reported as responsible for power system outages in many countries.
Types of fIres which cause outages include burning sugar cane fIelds, forest fIres,
grass fIfes, refuse burnings and oil fIres.
The flashover voltage of air insulation at high temperatures, as occur during under
fIre conditions, is drastically reduced when compared with values at ambient
temperature. The dielectric strength is dependent on the type of voltage stress
(AC, DC, and Impulse) and also on the proportion of the gap covered by flames.
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At high temperatures the flashover voltage of an electrode configuration IS
reduced due to the decrease of the relative air density within the gap.
For constant pressure the relative arr density decreases with increasing
temperature according to the expression from the Epri Transmission Line
Reference Book (Transmission Line Reference Book, 1982):
8 = O.289p
278.3+1
where p is in mbar and t in °C
Equation 10
Field measurements have shown that in the flames, temperature values of 900 °c
can be reached, thus 0 can be reduced to 0.25. In the presence of fires a great
number of floating particles are generated within the gap.
Figure 12. Photograph taken by the author of a sugar cane fire underneath
Arnot - Maputo 400 kV line
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The quantity of generated particles varies with the fIfe source being, for example,
greater for grass or sugar cane fIfes than for alcohol or gasoline fIfes. These
particles produced by burning are responsible for the greatest reduction on the
breakdown voltage under fIfe.
Flashovers may be caused by fIfes, including forest fIfes, sugar cane fIres, veld
fIfes, refuse burning and structure fIres (the most common ones). A tall fIre
column is necessary to produce hot ionized gases suffIciently close to the
conductors to cause flashovers.
The majority of fIre-induced flashovers occur at midspan. Past experience has
shown that it is not necessarily just long grass that can cause a flashover when it
bums underneath a power line but that the probability at flashover also depends
on various other factors such as:
- The phytomass present on the ground where a fIfe is burning.
- The various types of grass and its moisture content.
- The type of day such as very dry, humid, temperature and wind.
- Period since last bum i.e. height of growth.
The above factors influence the probability of a line to ground flashover. The air
density between the conductors and the ground changes as a result of veld fIfes.
A flame has a high ion and electron concentration making it reasonably
conductive. When a flame becomes large enough to extent from the ground into
the proximity of the conductor (within the sparking distance), the flame will
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immediately cause flashover. If a smoke column is composed of burning particles
it may be considered to be partially conductive.
2.9 Discussion
It is clear that each of the above fault mechanisms may contribute to causing
faults on the Eskom Transmission system. Some of these are not likely to be
classified as cause unknown (e.g. switching flashovers). The minimum clearances
used on the system applicable to some of the above mechanisms is included in
Table 3 below.
System Voltage Unom 220kV 275kV 400kV
Umax 245kV 300kV 420kV
Minimum Clearance at 1.85 m 2.35 m 3.2 m
tower (air gap)
Minimum Clearance at 6.7 m 7.2 m 8.1 m
centre
Glass Discs, mmlkV 15 mmlkV 18 mmlkV 23 mmlkV
PLIWL (Air gap at - 850kV 850kV
tower)
BIWL (Air gap at tower) 950kV 950kV 1175 kV
Conductor Bundle Twin Twin Twin/Tripl
Quad




This chapter discussed all the relevant flashover mechanisms and the applicabJe
theory models. These models will form the basis of the discussion that will
follow. From experience and the above models it is evident that mostly all line
faults can be linked to one of the four flashover mechanisms.
The following chapters will discuss the performances and analysis of the Eskom
Transmission network. It will also include the finding of evidences that can assist
to identify the cause of the line fault.
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3. PERFORMANCE OF THE ESKOM
TRANSMISSION NETWORK
3.1 Introduction
The following chapter will discuss all the known causes of transmission lines
faults. Actual field results and experience will be used to discuss the various
causes for the line faults. The knowledge gained in investigating line faults is of
vital importance as the unknown lines faults can be linked to anyone of the four
main fault causes in almost all cases.
3.2 Known Causes of Flashovers
Switching over-voltages are suspected to have a mmor impact on the line
flashovers. Causes of line faults that are relatively easy to identify are lightning
and veld/sugar cane frres. These types of faults occur mainly during the day and
are correlated via LPATS (Lightning) or observations of burning underneath the
power lines at the time of occurrence of the fault.
The bird streamer fault mechanism is more difficult to determine (birds are
transitory and not observed at the time of the fault) but in a number of cases one
may fmd evidence of bird streamers on the towers which would be used as an
indicator of the likely cause of the fault.
The methods to identify each known cause will now be discussed:
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3.2.1 Lightning
Eskom Transmission uses the Lightning Positioning And Tracking System
(LPATS) to determine whether a line fault was indeed caused by lightning.
There are currently 6 antennas at various locations to detect lightning strikes.
The data is then transferred to a central database at Megawatt Park.
A number of remote computers receive live data from this centralised database.
Actual lightning strikes are superimposed on the routes of the Transmission
lines. The actual location of the strikes can then be used to verify whether it did
hit a Transmission line.
Figure 13. A ftle from the Lightning Positioning And Tracking System
Used by Eskom Transmission to identify lightning caused line faults
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Figure 13 above is an example of such a lightning strike that did hit one
particular Transmission line and caused a fault. The time indicated on the figure
next to the lightning strike is very important. This time can be correlated with
the time stamp of the fault. The magnitude of the lightning strike is also
indicated which is in this case -59 kA. In this specific incidence, the fault
records were amended from "cause unknown" to "cause lightning".
Lightning related line faults normally occur in the northern parts of South
Africa. The lightning activity normally occur during the late afternoon periods
of a day and from September month to April month the following year. Figure
14 indicates a photograph of a flashover bum mark where the flashover was
caused by lightning.
Figure 14. Photograph taken by the author of burn marks
on the conductor caused by a lightning strike on the tower. Cause of fault
identified by examination of LPATS data.
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It must be noted however that the location of lightning strikes provided by
LPATS are not 100% accurate.
The time recorded for each strike by LPATS is accurate as it is connected to the
Geographical Position System (GPS). In certain cases the time recorder on fault
locators that is also connected to the GPS may then be used to compare it to the
time recorded in LPATS.
3.2.2 Veld/Sugar cane Fires
Veld or Sugar cane fIfes can normally be identified by visually inspecting the
servitude underneath the line. Figure 15 shows the typical burning of veld grass
underneath a power line.
Figure 15. Photograph of veld fire the Apollo - Duvha 400 kV line
(Photograph taken by V Viljoen, Eskom Transmission)
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For a veld fire to be able to cause a flashover to ground, the ftre must be a hot
ftre. As hot fIfes normally occur during the middle of the day (i.e. hottest period)
it may be identifted by examining the time of occurrence of the line fault.
Veld fires normally occur during the hot periods of a day, that is from 11 :00 to
16:00 and during the dry months of May to September. The Fire Danger Index
is an indicator that is increasingly used to determine the risk of flashover
resulting from lines. The three factors that are taken into account are: humidity,
temperature and wind speed. An investigation has revealed that overhead lines
normally flash to ground more easily during days of high Fire Danger Index
values.
The Fire Danger Index (FDI) gives a relative indication of how hot veld fIfes
will be if it occurs on a speciftc day. Sugar cane fires may also cause a
transmission line to flashover between phases or from the conductor to earth.
Two possible remedies for these types of faults is to switch the line out as soon
as there is a sugar cane ftre underneath the line or to cut the sugar cane before it
is burnt. Figures 16 shows the number of veld fIfe caused faults annually.
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Figure 16. Annual Monthly Average Fires of the Transmission Network
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3.2.3 Bird Streamer
Line faults caused by bird streamers normally occur before midnight (during
roosting) and then again in the early mornings (prior to birds leaving their roosts).
The evidence that a Line Patrolman is trained to look for is a bum mark on the
cross member above the V or I string and on the conductor or yoke plate.
Residual bird streamer pollution may sometimes also be found on the tower via
visual inspection. Photograph 17 gives an indication of evidence of the presence
of bird streamers. Such evidence is sought by line patrolman who carry the post
fault investigations.
Figure 17. Photograph taken by the author of Bird Pollution
On a tower of the Arnot-Simplon 275 kV line
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The photographs below show evidence ofbum marks on the yoke plate.
Figure 18. Photograph indicating the burn marks
on a yoke plate caused by a flashover (Photograph taken by
M Sibanyoni, Eskom Transmission)
3.2.4 Encroachment by Trees
In most cases line faults caused by trees occur during mid day (results of an
investigation (Eskom Transmission Investigation, 2000). The reason is that
Transmission lines may sag considerably during hot periods of the day and
causing the line to flash over from the conductor to the tree. These types of line
faults are normally easily identified by a burned tree.
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Figure 19. Photograph taken of the encroachment
of trees under an overhead Transmission line (Photograph taken by
C Chiloane, Eskom Transmission)
3.3 Unknown Causes
As indicated by Britten (Britten, 1999) the Eskom Transmission Network is
experiencing an exceptionally high number of the so-called unexplained line
faults. The intention of this report is to analyse a number of factors and compare
each one to the other in order to reach a conclusion.
The high percentage of unexplained line faults (35 %) is very important for the
Transmission group to minimise. Major efforts to minimise the number of
"known" faults such as bird streamers, veld fIfes, sugar cane fIfes, lightning and
light pollution, light wetting mechanism has been undertaken by Eskom
Transmission.
54
When the statistical data of the unexplained line faults is analysed carefully and
in detail it should be possible to categorise these unexplained line faults into the
most probable known categories via statistical analysis. Correct identification of
the cause of fault is usually done by a line patrol reporting back to operations and
maintenance management. It is critical that the responsible patrolman is trained
and is not pressured into falsely identifying the cause of fault.
The analysis excludes the following known fault mechanisms: the bird streamer
mechanism, bird pollution, lightning, sugar cane fires and veld fires.
The report focuses on the following:
• Identification of the under performing lines (Rogue Lines) of the
main Transmission Network,
• Comparison between the Rogue Lines with respect to: Area,
Voltage, Weather information,
• Line fault during time of day and Line fault during month of the
year.
The analysis of these lines indicated that unexplained flashovers normally occur
between 22:00 and 07:00 the following morning. Almost all the Rogue Lines in
South Africa fall in the sub-tropical/humid climatical area. All the Rogue Lines
studied are insulated only with glass discs.
From the analysis it was concluded that most unexplained related line faults
occur during the months when the seasons changes, e.g. from autumn to winter.
The performance of the lines was analysed for the years 1993 to 1997. The
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analysis indicates that most unexplained line faults occurred during April to May
and August to September.
Unexplained line faults normally occur from 22:00 to 7:00 in the morning. One
of the reasons could be due to dew formation on the insulator discs in the early
morning period, or due to high voltages during night times as the loading is at its
minimum. The presence of mist with other factors can also be a cause during
these hours for the lines to trip
3.4 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PERFORMANCE OF LINES
3.4.1 Network Loading
The voltages on the Transmission Network will generally be lower during
periods of peak loading and higher during periods of off-peak loading. The
loading for the Transmission Network over a 24 hour period is shown in Figure
20.
There is an obvious correlation between time of day of unexplained line faults
and the system loading (i.e. lower system operating loading and hence higher
system voltage) coinciding with larger number of unexplained flashovers.
Due to lower system demand the voltage tends to increase from 22:00 at night to
06:00. This higher system voltage would most reasonably be expected to
increase the probability of flashover due to either bird streamer mechanisms or
some type of pollution flashover. At night, on the high lying regions of South
Africa, heavy dews may form causing heavy wetting of glass disc insulators
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which when combined with the higher operating voltage of the system, may,
cause flashover.
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Figure 20: Maximum demand on the Eskom network versus
the number of unexplained line faults over a 24-hour period
This may provide an explanation why there is an increase in unexplained faults
that occur during the early mornings and evenings, as these are the periods with
minimum demand on the network and humidity higher than 75 %, which could
have caused the line trips due to some unexplained pollution phenomenon




This chapter concerns itself with techniques for categorizing unknown fault
mechanisms in to one or more possible known causes. This section focuses on the
220 kV, 275 kV and the 400 kV voltage levels. The performance of the entire
network was subjected to statistical analysis for the period of 1993 to 1997. The
faults that were recorded for this period were analyzed in terms of Time of Day,
Month of Year and climatic region. This analysis provides some indication of
which of the mechanisms described in section 2 may be playing a dominant role
in causing faults particularly for the category of faults listed as unknowns.
Figure 21 gives an indication of the percentage of line fault categories on the
Transmission Network for the time period 1993 to 1997. This chart has been
derived from the line fault records ofEskom Transmission.











Indication on contribution of the various line fault causes of the Transmission
Network in percentage.
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Important infonnation contained in this figure is that 35 % of all faults are
categorized as unknown or unexplained. A major effort has focussed on
minimizing the ''known'' faults, such as bird caused faults. The focus of the
statistical analysis is to determine the causes of the unexplained faults
The analysis was perfonned from a consideration of identified parameters that
may impact on the system perfonnance such as weather condition, climatic areas,
network loading, bird activity in the vicinity of the line.
4.2 Time of Day analysis for the whole network.
An analysis of time of day of the unexplained faults for the whole Transmission
Network is given in Figure 22. The total number of faults subjected to this
analysis was 1433. The figure indicates that across the whole network the number
of unexplained faults for the whole network is a strong function of time of day.
The largest number of unknown faults occur at night.
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Figure 22. Unexplained Line faults over a 24-hour period
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The time of day occurrence of unexplained line faults normally exhibits a peak
from 22:00 to 07:00 in the morning. One of the reasons could be due to dew
formation in the insulator discs in the early morning period, or due to high
voltages during night times as the loading is at its minimum. The presence of mist
with other factors may also be a cause during these hours for the lines to trip.
Further, a slight increase can be seen on Figure 22 around 13:00 to 14:00. A
possible reason for this is that line sagging may occur at that time of day due to
high system load and high day time temperature, the line could flash over to a line
it crosses, such as a distribution line. Another reason may be the incorrect
classification of a known flashover e.g. due to veld fITes or sugar cane fITes.
During hot humid days the system experience in the past has been that veld fire
caused line faults tend to occur more. The role that system loading condition plays
regarding this issue will be discussed later.
A brief summary of the performance of the 220 kV, 275 kV and 400 kV networks
is given as follows:
• The 275 kV lines tend to trip more during lightning storms as compared
to 400 kV and 220 kV lines over a 24-hour period.
• The 400 kV lines tend to trip more often at 06:00 due to unexplained
reasons, but the 275 kV lines trip more often at 09:00.
• During the time period from 13:00 to 19:00 the 275 kV lines also trip
more that the 400 kV lines as a result of unexplained causes. This
corresponds with the fact that the 275 kV lines trip more due to lightning
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as lightning occurs normally from 13:00 to 19:00. One possible
explanation then is that lightning caused faults are probably
misclassified as "unknown" when, in fact, the cause is lightning.
Figure 23 compares the flashovers of 220 kV, 275 kV and 400 kV lines over a 24-
hour period (average over 3 years). The vertical axis indicates the percentage fault
contribution for each of the three voltage levels investigated as a function of time
of day (horizontal axis).
0%




Figure 23. Number of unexplained line faults over 24 hour period including
275 kV versus 400 kV versus 220 kV
Figure 23, indicates that a major cause of275 kV line faults may be lightning
activity and that this is a more significant cause of faults on the 275 kV system
than the 400 kV system.
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From Figure 23 the following conclusions may be drawn:
1. The 400 kV lines tend to trip more often during the period of 6:00 am to 7:00
am due to unknown reasons. The 275 kV lines trip more at 09:00 am.
2. During the time period from 13:00 to 19:00 the 275 kV lines also tend to trip
more than the 400kV lines as result of unexplained causes. This corresponds
with the fact that 275 kV lines trip more due to lightning as lightning activity is
highest during this period.
From the research report on the unknown category of line faults by Britten et aI, it
was determined that the predominant specific creepages on the 275 kV and 400
kV lines are respectively 14.9 and 15.3 mm/kV. However, since U120 glass disc
insulators were installed from 1988, the creepages have increased to 17.0 and 17.5
mmlkV respectively.
The higher insulation level of400 kV lines compared to 275 kV lines may provide
an explanation for the observation that the 275 kV lines trip more than the 400 kV
lines during lightning storms.
4.3 Time of Year analysis
During seasonal changes (April-May) it is clearly visible, in Figure 24, that more
unexplained flashovers occur. The reason for this phenomenon is that mist and fog
normally occurs during these months of a year as a result of fairly high humidity
and large daily temperature variations.
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Figure 24. Number of unexplained faults over an annual base.
Humidity annual tends to follow the curve as shown in Figure 32.
The high number of unexplained faults during November to December could be
due to early morning lightning which, normally may occur in the areas at higher
altitudes.
The emigration of birds as a result of seasonal changes will influence the fault
mechanism in the early mornings being either a bird streamer or light pollution,
light wetting.
The above figures are then discussed in more depth below, firstly by looking at
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Figure 25. Number of unexplained faults in February over a 24-hour period
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Figure 26. Number of unexplained faults in May over a 24-hour period
From Figures 25 and 26 above it can clearly be seen that in February the highest
number of unknown occurs from 05:00 - 06:00 in the morning hours but for the
month of May the highest number of unknown line faults occur from 06:00 -
07:00.








a) During February there is normally no mist/fog present.
b) During the month ofMay there is normally mist or fog present in early
morning periods.
c) In February months the sun normally rises around 05:00 - 06:00 in the
morning whereas the month of May the sun rises later (between 06:00 -
07:30).
d) Early morning unknown faults may also be ascribed to the fact that roosting
birds may become more active at sunrise; that is, failures associated with
roosting birds (bird streamer flashover) will most likely follow the time of
sunnse.
During the month of September (Figure 27) the number of unexplained faults is
virtually identical to that pattern of the month of May. There is, however, an
increase in the number of unexplained faults from 13:00 to 15:00. (This increase
in line faults in September maybe due to the start of the lightning season).
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Figure 28. Number of unexplained faults in November over a 24 hour period.
In the month of November the highest number of unexplained faults occurs in the
early morning hours (i.e. from 03:00 to 07:00). The summer rainfall pattern over
much of South Africa results (in many years) in heavy rainfall (thunderstorms) in
the months of September and October. Such heavy rainfalls may lead to the
establishment of fresh water reservoirs in various catchments. Bird life tends to
congregate in the vicinity of water locations and hence in these months it is likely
that bird life and bird activity will stretch over a wider range than in dry months of
the year. Hence unknown faults due to the bird streamer mechanism may become
more widespread in September and October.
Figure 29 summarizes the above figures and clearly indicate the following:
December: The unexplained line faults could be due to lightning. From 10:00 in
the mornings and especially around 17:00 - 19:00 is when lightning activities are
very active.
November: Tends to have the same pattern as the December months
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October Months: It can be seen that the line faults in the early hours of the
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Figure 29. Number of unexplained faults monthly over 24 hour period.
June Months: The highest number of line faults occurs around noon in June. This
tends to indicate that the faults are due to veld fIres.
Comparing the time of occurrence of the highest number of unexplained line
faults to specific hours of the day, the following conclusions may be drawn.
Sunrise in June normally occurs approximately 2 hours later than in January at the
latitude of the poor performing lines. In summer, sunrise occurs at around 05 :00
and in winter around 07:00. Figure 30 indicates that the number of unexplained
line faults corresponds to this shift in time of sunrise. Most unexplained line faults
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occur from 04:00 - 05:00 in January and from 06:00 - 07:00 in June. In March
and April and then again in October the highest number of unexplained line faults
occur from 05:00 - 06:00. Due to numerous reasons birds normally migrate to the
north of South Africa. It tends to show then that the early morning line faults may











Figure 30. Percentage of Unexplained line faults from 04:00 to 07:00
over an annual base.
Due to the fact that mist and dense fog develops at night times in April and May
Figure 31 indicates that the highest number of unexplained flashover from 00:00 -
01:00 occur during these two months and then again in August to October. This
then supports the theory that the highest number of unknowns occurs in the
seasonal change over months.
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The same argument holds for the time period 23:00 - 00:00. From the discussions
and analysis done to this point it may be noted that quite a number of the
unexplained line faults may be connected to a known cause. Line faults labelled as
unexplained are generally not unexplained but the evidence for the cause of fault
could not be found by the patrolman. A further analysis was done to find the


















Figure 31. Percentage of unexplained line faults from 22:00 to 02:00
over an annual base.
It is of utmost importance then to start analysing the line faults more in depth, in
order to answer the following questions :
1. Time of the line fault?
2. In which month did the line fault occur?
3. What is the fault current that did flow?
4. In what climatic area/vegetation is the line running through?
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4.4 Relative Humidity
The relative humidity of the regions through which 10 rogue lines run per month
is shown in Figure 32. The trend of this figures follows the trend of the number of
unexplained line faults monthly of all the lines in Eskom Transmission in that the
peak of unknown faults co-incides with the peak average monthly humidity (April
and May).













Figure 32. Percentage of unexplained line faults versus Relative Humidity
over an annual base.
This indicates that the mechanisms by which a number of unknown faults are
caused are related to high humidity. From the figure above it is interesting to note
that during the seasonal change over months, May and September, the
unexplained line faults increase.
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4.5 Conclusion
The overall analysis of all the lines in the Transmission network indicates strong
correlation between the occurrence of a large number of faults and a number of
other variable parameters. In particular, there is a strong correlation between the
periods of the highest numbers of unknown faults an the following parameters:
- system operating voltage
- expected times ofbird activity (bird streamer mechanism)
- seasons of high lightning activity
- seasons of high humidity
This analysis indicates that it may be possible to categorise all unknown faults
occurring on the system into categories of probable causes identified through a
combination of time of day analysis, time of year analysis and the region through
which an individual line runs. Case studies of the applicability of these ideas are
included in the following chapter.
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5. Identified Rogue Lines in Transmission
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of an attempt to categorize
unknown faults on 9 different transmission lines over the period 1993 to 1997 into
categories ofprobable causes.
The time of day and time of year analysis developed in chapter 4 is applied
systematically to each line (considered to be poor performing lines) and the
probable causes of flashover and hence listed.
Line Name Total Tripsover
60 Months
1 ARARAT-SPITSKOP 2 275KV LINE 32
2 KOMATIPOORT-MARATHON275KV 25
3 HYDRA-RUIGTEVALLEI 400KV LINE 16
4 WARMBAD-WITKOP 1 275KV LINE 23
5 ARNOT-MERENSKY 1 400KV LINE 15
6 BETA - HYDRA 1 400KV LINE 16
7 MATIMBA - MIDAS 2 400KV 44
8 PLUTO - WATERSHED 1275KV 19
9 TABOR - WITKOP 275KV LINE 19
Table 4: Indicates the number of unexplained faults these particular lines
experienced over a period of three year, from 1993 - 1997.
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5.1 Ararat - Spitskop 2 Line
From Figure 33 it can be seen that a large number of unexplained line faults occur
in the early morning hours of the day, late afternoons and around midnight. When
the monthly line fault (Figure 34) analysis is also brought into consideration it
ARARAT-SPITSKOP 2275KV
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Figure 33. Number of Unexplained line faults of the Ararat-Spitskop line
over a 24 hour period.
may be determined that this line tends to trip more during the seasonal changes
(namely May and August) than during the rest of the year. As this line falls in the
sub-tropical climatic area it indicates that dew could possibly form on the glass
discs of the insulator string. The line faults occurring from 17:00 to 18:00 possibly
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Figure 34. Number of Unexplained line faults of the Ararat-Spitskop line on an
annual base.
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This line is running in the North Western region of South Africa, which also falls
within an area where frost occurs frequently. It is also running in the area with a
fairly high density of lightning.
5.1.1 Identification of likely cause of unknowns for the Ararat - Spitskop line
a) Lightning as a possible mechanism
A significant number of the unexplained line faults occurred between the late
afternoon hours of 16:00 to 18:00. This could indicate lightning is a probable
cause.
b) Fires as a possible mechanism
No correlation between the records and unknowns can be found.
Fires are therefore not suspected as a cause of the line faults.
c) Bird Streamers as a possible mechanism
Good correlation with the time of day analysis and time of year analysis.
Analysis indicates line faults just before mid night and some during early
mommgs.
Bird streamers therefore suspected as a cause of the line faults
d) Pollution and Wetting as a possible mechanism
Very good correlation with record especially, during April to May months, and
again from August to September months.
Pollution with wetting (mist, dew) therefore suspected as a cause of the line
faults.
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5.2 Komatipoort -Marathon line
Figure 35 indicates that unexplained faults mostly occurred during the late
afternoons. An analysis of Figure 36 shows that most of the faults occurred in
June -July and November -December.
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Figure 35. Number of Unexplained line faults of the Komatipoort-
Marathon line over a 24 period
This clearly indicates that this line does not trip due to bird streamer, pollution or
due to light pollution, light wetting but due to veld fires, sugar cane fires (June-




















Figure 36. Number of Unexplained line faults of Komatipoort-Marathon line
over an annual base
This line is running in the North Eastern parts of South Africa. From Figure 4 it
can be seen that no days with frost occur in the region of this line. From Figure 5
it can however be seen that the lightning density in the area where the line is
running through has a very high lightning density.
5.2.1 Identification of likely cause of unknowns for the Komatipoort-Marathon
line
a) Lightning
Line faults during late afternoons indicate towards lightning activity.
Lightning is therefore suspected as a cause for the line faults.
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b) Fires
The line is running over large areas of sugar cane. Correlation between records
indicates that during mid days, when the farmers burn sugar cane, the line do trip
due to sugar cane fires.
Sugar cane fires therefore suspected as a cause of the line faults.
c) Bird Streamers
Bird streamers normally occur from 22:00 to 01 :00 am and in the early morning
periods. This indicates that the line faults are probably not due to bird streamers.
d) Pollution and Wetting
No correlation between records and unknowns as no pollution are present on the
insulator discs. Pollution and wetting therefore not suspected as a cause.
5.3. Hydra - Ruigtevallei line
As can be seen in Figure 38 most unexplained faults occur during the early

















Figure 37. Number of Unexplained line faults of Hydra-Ruigtevallei line
over an annual base
Just before midnight there is again an increase in unexplained faults.
Figure 37 gives an indication during which months of the year these line
faults mostly occur.
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Figure 38. Number of Unexplained line faults of the Hydra-Ruigtevallei line
over a 24 hour period.
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From Figure 37 it is very clear that the unexplained faults occur mostly in April
(Seasonal change from autumn to winter) and again from early September to
November (spring to mid summer).
Evidence has shown that these unexplained faults are mostly due to bird streamers
as well as bird pollution on the insulator discs. From April to May dew is forming
on the insulator surface and thereby wetting the bird pollution. The light pollution,
light wetting mechanism is then taking place. From early spring, September, the
very familiar bird streamer mechanism applies.
5.3.1. Identification of likely cause of unknowns for the Hydra-Ruigtevallei 1 line
a) Lightning
No correlation between records and unknowns. During the day there is no line
faults and lightning normally occur during the day. Therefore lightning is not
suspected to be a cause for the line faults.
b) Fires
During midday, 12:00 to 16:00, veld fires are mostly the cause for line faults.
There is no correlation between records and unknowns.
Fires are therefore not suspected to be a cause for line faults.
c) Bird Streamers
Correlation between records clearly indicates that bird streamers is most probably
the main contributor to unknown line faults.
Bird Streamers are therefore suspected as a cause for line faults.
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d) Pollution and Wetting
Pollution on the insulator discs is due to the bird streamers. This, however, may be
also be a contributor to unknown faults.
Pollution with wetting is suspected as a cause for the line faults.
5.4 Warmbad -Witkop 275 kV line
The Warmbad - Witkop line is well known for all the unexplained trips it had
over long period of time. Due to heat and wet conditions during the spring months
and especially during the summer months one can make the assumption that high
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Figure 39. Number of Unexplained line faults for the Warmbad-Witkop line
over an annual base.
The analysis of this line is complicated because bird streamers are also a known











Figure 40. Number of Unexplained line faults of the Warmbad-Witkop line
over a 24 hour period.
The time of day graph Figure 40 indicates that Time of Day and Time of Year do
not indicate a defInitive cause for these faults. During the evening hours of a day
the line faults are most probably due to bird streamers and during the early
morning (01:00 - 03:00) due to light pollution and light wetting. During the
sunrise hours it is probably due to bird streamers again.
5.4.1. Identification of likely cause of unknowns for the Warmbad-Witkop line
a) Lightning
From the graphs it can be seen that lightning, which normally occur during the
late afternoons, is not the major cause for the unexplained line faults.
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b) Fires
The line faults mostly occur during the evenings. Veld fires, which cause the lines
to fault, occur during day time. It is therefore suspected that veld fITes are also not
a major cause for line faults.
c) Bird Streamers
Excellent correlation between data especially just before mid night and early
mornings can be noted. Bird Streamers are therefore suspected to be the major
cause for line faults.
d) Pollution and Wetting
During the high humidity months of the year and time periods after midnight there
is a very good correlation with data. Pollution and wetting is therefore expected to
be a cause for the line faults on the line
5.5. Arnot-Merensky 400 kV line
As may be seen in Figure 41 unexplained faults normally occur from February
months towards the end of April and then again during the mid winter months,
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Figure 41. Number of Unexplained line faults of the Arnot-Merensky line
over an annual base
The occurrence of mist/fog is very common during the changing over of seasons,
from summer to autumn. Regular veld fires occur during the mid winter months
towards the beginning of spring. The unexplained line faults start to pick up again
from October to the end ofDecember and the beginning of January.
The time of day figure indicates that the highest number of unexplained faults
occur in the early morning, during mid day and some faults in the late afternoons
and then again at 20:00 and 22:00.
This line is running through an area where mist/fog occurs regularly during March
to May months. Birds are also very active in this area which means that a high
number of unexplained faults may have been due to bird streamers and with the
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Figure 42. Number of Unexplained line faults of the Arnot-Merensky line
over a 24 hour period.
The line runs through a rocky terrain and the number of lightning strikes per km2
is very high. This type of fault normally occurs during the summer months. From
the figure one can see that unexplained tlashovers start to increase from
September month again.
During the winter months the dry weather results in dry veld grass. Fire caused
faults then become likely. This is noticeable in Figure 41. The time of day
analysis correlate excellently with the time of year analysis.
5.5.1. Identification of likely cause of unknowns for the Arnot-Merensky line
a) Lightning
There is a good correlation between the number of unexplained faults and the time
of day and time of year when lightning occur. Although it is suspected to be a
cause for the line faults it is not the major cause for line faults.
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b) Fires
There is a correlation between the records. It is also not suspected to a major
cause for the line faults.
c) Bird Streamers
There is a good correlation between records. Bird streamers are therefore expected
to be a cause for these line faults.
d) Pollution and Wetting
Pollution on the insulator discs is due to the bird streamers. This, however, may
also be a contributor to unknown faults.
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5.6. Beta - Hydra 1 400kV line
The Beta - Hydra 1 line is running through a very dry area with normally high















Figure 43. Number of Unexplained line faults of the Beta-Hydra 1 line
over a 24 hour period.
In the early hours of the morning (02:00 - 03:00) the line most probably trips due
to light pollution, light wetting and in the early mornings due to (06:00-07:00)
bird streamers. This line has been known for tripping due to bird streamers for
some considerable period.
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The time of year graph shown in Figure 44 indicates clearly that the line tends to
trip during the changing over of seasons (May) and spring as well as December
and January months.
Beta - Hydra 1
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Figure 44. Number of Unexplained line faults of the Beta-Hydra 1 line
over an annual base.
5.6.1. Identification of likely cause of unknowns for the Beta-Hydra 1 line
a) Lightning
Figure 43 indicates no correlation between fault records and unknowns. During
the day there is no line faults and lightning normally occur during the day.
Therefore lightning is not suspected to be a cause for the line faults.
b) Fires
During midday, 12:00 to 16:00, veld fIfes are mostly the cause for line faults.
There is no correlation between records and unknowns.
Fires are therefore not suspected to be a cause for line faults.
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c) Bird Streamers
Figure 44 indicates excellent correlation between records, especially just before
mid night and early mornings. Bird Streamers are therefore suspected to be the
major cause for line faults.
d) Pollution and Wetting
During the high humidity months of the year and time periods after midnight there
is a very good correlation with records. Pollution and wetting is therefore
expected to be a cause for the line faults on the line
5.7 Matimba - Midas 2
The Matimba - Midas 2 line is the most difficult line out of all rogue lines to
investigate due to the fact that it trips almost during all times of a day (see Figure
45).
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Figure 45. Number of Unexplained line faults of the Matimba-Midas 2 line
over a 24 hour period.
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The time of the year graph indicates that the line faults occur during all seasons. It
is therefore possible that these line faults are due to various causes. The first cause
may be light pollution light wetting. During April and May where the time of day
analysis indicates trips during the early morning hours. During the winter months,
June and August, veld fITes are the likely cause. Time of day analysis indicates
that the line trips from 10:00 in the morning to 18:00 in the afternoons during
these months.
During the November to December months the line most probably trips due to
birds during the night-time.
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Figure 46. Number of Unexplained line faults of the Matimba-Midas 2 line
over an annual base.
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5.7.1 Identification of likely cause of unknowns for the Matimba - Midas 2 line
a) Lightning
From the graphs it can be seen that lightning, which normally occur during the
late afternoons, are not the major cause for the unexplained line faults.
b) Fires
There is a small correlation between the records. It is also not suspected to a major
cause for the line faults.
c) Bird Streamers
Excellent correlation between records, especially just before mid night and early
mornings. Bird Streamers are therefore suspected to be the major cause for line
faults.
d) Pollution and Wetting
During the high humidity months of the year and time periods after midnight there
is a correlation with records. Pollution and wetting is therefore expected to be a
cause for the line faults on the line
5.8 Pinto - Watershed
The Pluto - Watershed line is also very well known for its high number of
unexplained line faults. From January to March the line tripped numerous times.
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Figure 47. Number of Unexplained line faults of the Pluto-Watershed line
over an annual base.
When the time of day graph is also analysed it may be seen that the line tend to
trip throughout the night time, peaking at around 21 :00 at night. Due to the fact
that this line also runs in an area that experiences a high density of lightning









Figure 48. Number of Unexplained line faults of the PIuto-Watershed line
over a 24 hour period.
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periods of a day. This correlates back to the time of year when the line tended to
trip more during the typical changing over of seasons, in April and September
months.
5.8.1 Identification of likely cause of unknowns for the Pluto-Watershed line
a) Lightning
The graphs indicates that there may be a few line faults in the later afternoons and
during January to May months of the years. Lightning is not suspected to be a
major cause for the unexplained line faults.
b) Fires
During midday, 12:00 to 16:00, veld fires are mostly the cause for line faults.
There is no correlation between records and unknowns.
Fires are therefore not suspected to be a cause for line faults.
c) Bird Streamers
There is correlation between records, especially just before mid night and early
mornings. Bird Streamers are therefore suspected to be the major cause for line
faults.
d) Pollution and Wetting
During the high humidity months of the year and time periods after midnight there
is a good correlation with records. Pollution and wetting is therefore expected to
be a cause for the line faults on the line
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5.9 Tabor - Witkop
The Tabor - Witkop line tends to trip from the early morning hours of 01:00 till
07:00. In the evenings there are one or two faults between 22:00 and 23:00. The
line faults occur during seasonal changes. During seasonal changes mist or fog is
present. Bird activity is also present in areas where this line is running through.














Figure 49. Number of Unexplained line faults of the Tabor-Witkop line
over a 24 hour period.
In the beginning of the year there is an increase of unexplained faults. This
correlates with the behaviour patterns of birds, as they are very active during that
period of the year. As a result it can be concluded that the unexplained faults in
January and February are due to bird streamers and the faults in April and May are














Figure 50. Number of Unexplained line faults of the Tabor-Witkop line
over an annual base.
5.9.1 Identification of likely cause of unknowns for the Tabor-Witkop line
a) Lightning
No correlation between records and unknowns. During the day there is no line
faults and lightning normally occur during the day. Therefore lightning is not
suspected to be a cause for the line faults.
b) Fires
The time of day graph indicates that the unexplained line faults is probably not
due to veld fIfes.
c) Bird Streamers
Correlation between records, especially just before mid night and early mornings.
Bird Streamers are therefore suspected to be the ma~ ,cause for line faults.
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d) Pollution and Wetting
During the high humidity months of the year and time periods after midnight there
is a very good correlation with records. Pollution and wetting is therefore
expected to be a cause for the line faults on the line.
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5.10 Conclusion
In this chapter the advantage by doing analysis of line faults during the time of
day and month of the year, was realised. It also supports the view point that all
line faults can be linked to the four basic line fault mechanisms.
When a line fault occur and no evidence can be found, like flash marks, one can
then use the methods as discussed in this to determine to determine the most
probable cause for the line faldt.
Line Name Possible causes ofunexplained line faults
Lightning Fires Bird Pollution
Streamers & Wetting
1 ARARAT-SPITSKOP 2 X X X
2 KOMATIPOORT-MARATHON X X
3 HYDRA-RUIGTEVALLEI X X
4 WARMBAD-WITKOP 1 X X
5 ARNOT-MERENSKY 1 X X
6 BETA- HYDRA 1 X X
7 MATIMBA - MIDAS 2 X X
8 PLUTO - WATERSHED 1 X X
9 TABOR - WITKOP X X
Table 5. Summary table of Rogue Lines and probable line
Fault causes
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6. DISCUSSION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF FINDINGS
The current process followed to identify the causes for transmission line faults are:
- The distance to fault is used to identify the nearest tower at which the
line faulted.
- .The patrolman investigates the fault by inspecting the line and look for visible
flash marks on the tower or insulator strings.
Table 6 below intended to assist field personnel to identify or determine what was
the cause for a line fault. The table is intended as a guide and is not intended to
replace the fault findings and investigations to be carried out by Patrolmen. From
the discussion in the previous sections, the following general conclusions can be
made to identify line fault causes:
a) The identification of flash marks on those lines, that have a low fault current is
very difficult.
b) The identification of flash marks on lines which tripped outside of the morning
and evening peak is difficult as the fault currents will be lower and the
evidence of the flashover does not show a visible mark.
c) Line fault investigators should always find out whether mist or fog was present
during the time of trip. This will not always assist in fmding the fault as a flash
over may occur due to dew that formed on the insulator discs.
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d) The winter months of May to August have proven to be the months in which
lines trip in the period of mid day to late afternoon due to veld or sugar can
fires and in the mornings due to pollution and wetting.
e) During the seasonal change over months of April and September the lines
normally only trip in the early morning as the veld and sugar cane fire burning
seasons have not initiated or have been completed.
During the spring and summer months lightning is normally the cause of line
faults from 14:00 to early evenings.
The above analysis involving Time Of Day (TOD) and Time Of Year (TOY)
analysis enables the network operator to identify the causes of unacceptable
performance to a higher degree of confidence and hence implement remedial
measures on problematic lines, which after involves major capital expenditure.
At this stage indications that have been derived from investigations into the causes
of unknown tlashovers on the lines investigations point to birds and fires as well
as some events occur during periods of heavy condensation, which may indicate a
pollution type ofmechanism.
Various actions may be taken. Examples include retrofitting bird guards,
increasing specific creepages and fITe monitoring. Of further importance is the
ability to train line inspectors to correctly identify causes of faults to ensure
accurate records for later statistical analysis.
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The identification of line faults depends purely on the know how of the person
inspecting the line fault, usually the patrolman, and the accuracy of the distance
from the substation to the fault in order to assist the inspector to find the fault.
The techniques developed in this thesis are intended to assist the engineering staff
in determine beforehand what could have caused the line to trip by examining the
time of day and time of year during which the line tripped. Hence the cause which
is most probably responsible may be identified particularly if an inspection team
does not find visible evidence.
The two mechanisms of transmission line faults that are the most probable cause
of unexplained line faults are the light pollution, light wetting mechanism and bird
streamers. The fact that historically a high percentage of faults were categorised as
unexplained or unknown due to the low fault currents at night and due to the faster
protection installed on the Transmission Network.
Lack of experience of the line inspectors also plays a major role. If inspectors are
trained to determine a possible cause before an inspection team investigates a fault
will greatly assist in locating the evidence as the inspection team will be able to
focus there inspection on specific regions of flashmarks.
In order to minimise bird streamer and light pollution light wetting caused line
faults, bird guards should be installed. By doing so the birds can no longer roost
on the towers but the insulators should also be cleaned or replaced. Where a
transmission line is running close to other types of pollution sources, such as
Hendrina Power station or industrial pollution sites, the insulators should be
replaced with composite insulators.
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A main factor playing a role for a line to flash over during a veld fIre is the
temperature of the fIre. The smoke particles may play a much smaller role.
Experience has showed that when the grass is cut underneath a line it then does
not necessarily mean that it will not cause the line to flash over. The probability of
a fIre causing a flashover will depend upon the fIre danger index (FDI) and the
location of small or large trees that may catch fIre underneath a transmission line.
Sugar cane fires will, in probably all cases, cause a line to flash over between
phases or to ground. The only remedy is to have an outage management plan for
sugar cane fIres and to visually check that no fIres are started underneath the lines.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has developed a systematic approach to the identification of the most
probable cause of transmission line fault where the cause is not accurately
identified but listed as "cause unknown". In particular the following conclusions
are drawn:
• The South African network is constructed over widely varying geographic
and climatic regions.
• Time-of-day analysis is a useful tool for identification of probable causes
of faults but does suffer from limitations.
• Time-of-year analysis, when coupled to considerations of climatic zones
and identified possible flashover mechanisms, has been shown to be a
powerful new technique. for assessment of the probable causes of
flashovers.
• The developed techniques may be used to substantiate corrective action
such as the fitting of bird guards or may provide evidence as to whether a
particular corrective action is likely to reduce the number of line faults on
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The On-line Leakage Current Analyser was installed on the frrst tower outside of
Highveld Power station on the Everest - Highveld line. Highveld Power station is about
10 km South East of Sasolburg where the Sasol Industry generates heavy industrial
pollution.
Different types of insulators were installed with the scope to determine the differences in


















Figure 51. Positive Leakage Currents and Relative Humidity during a morning
period.
Only a few days of accurate data was captured. It did, however give an indication on the
leakage currents over the insulators one can expect with the humidity at the same time.
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As can be seen on the Figure above the leakage currents is very high like the humidity,
just before sunrise. These measurements were taken on the 9 September 1998. With
high humidity like this it can be expected to have dew formation on the insulator discs.
With the presence of light pollution on the insulator disc and the dew, the leakage
currents increase leading to a flashover over the string from the live conductor to the
tower. The process described above supports the hypothesis of the light pollution light
wetting mechanism.
A fog chamber was build a laboratory to simulate the above. Unfortunately no
measurements could be retrieved from the OLeA but visually it confirmed what is




The following tests were carried out in February 2000 in the laboratory. Due to the fact
that the OLeA (On-line Leakage current analyser) sampling rate is defaulted at 10
minutes no actual leakage current measurement were obtained.
A Kaolin mixture with water was used. 2kg Kaolin and 0 litres water.
A string of 16 Glass msulators were used. (UI90?) .
Test 1.
Add 2.5 9 salt lliter = 125 9 for 50 liters
Pollute the complete insulator string with mixture.
• Maximum of 12 mA leakage current measured
Test 2.
Pollute the complete insulator string with mixture with a mixture of
2.5 g salt / litre = 125 g for 50 litres)
Pollute only the bottom 3 Insulator discs with 5 g salt / litre = 500g for 50 litres
No abnormal leakage currents
Test 3.
Pollute the complete insulator string with mixture of 5g salt / litre = 250g for 50 litres
Pollute only the bottom 3 Insulator discs with 109 salt / litre = 500g for 50 litres
No abnormal leakage currents
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Test 4.
Pollute the complete insulator string with mixture of 109 salt / litre = 500g for 50 litres
Pollute only the bottom 3 Insulator discs with 20 g salt / litre = 1000g for 50 litres
Leakage currents can be seen on the discs on top of the three more heavily polluted
discs.
Test 5.
Pollute the complete insulator string with mixture of 20g salt / litre = 1000g for 50 litres
Pollute only the bottom 3 Insulator discs with 40 g salt / litre = 2000g for 50 litres
Leakage activity more or less the same as in Test 4.
Test 6.
Pollute the complete insulator string with mixture of 40g salt / litre = 2000g for 50 litres
Put in a broken discs 4th from the bottom live end.
The fITst insulator on the live end showed a lot a leakage current activity. The three
insulators from the live end showed leakage current activity as well.
Test 7.
Pollute the complete insulator string with mixture of 40g salt / litre = 2000g for 50 litres
Put in a broken discs 9th from the bottom live end.
The same activity as in Test 6. The first insulator on the live end showed a lot a leakage
current activity. The three insulators from the live end showed leakage current activity
as well.
